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The title of this essay may be somewhat confusing. Sartre's
Transcendence of the Ego is not only the title of one of his books, it is also
avery terse description of the theory put forth in that book. The pure ego,
as described by HusserI, is deemed by Sartre: the transcendental ego. So
when Sartre speaks of the transcendental ego, he is actually referring to the
pure ego: the designation I will use. Sartre's own theory describes a
"transcendent ego."
In this essay I intend to briefly describe: 1) HusserI's conception of
the pure ego, 2) Sartre's criticism ofthis theory, 3) his own theory of the ego,
and 4) a criticism of this theory. Hopefully I may give a simplified qua
clearer picture of Husserlian and (pre-CritiQ.Ue of Dialectical Reason)
Sartrean Phenomenolo gy.
The Pure or Transcendental Ego
Edmund HusserI's conception of the pure ego varies wilh each of
his major works. Here I will concentrate on the ~.
To begin with, for Husserl and for Sartre, consciousness is always
consciousness of something, this is intentionality in a nutshell. When one
is thinking (or for that matter, acting, desiring, etc.), one is always thinking
of something. I.e. something is intended. What is important here is the
subject of the intentions. I am thinking of this, I am intending that. This I
is exemplifying of the pure ego. When there is consciousness of anything,
there is the subject of that consciousness, this subjectivity is the I.
So far this I maybe deemed an empirical ego. That is, a "believing,"
psycho-physical subject within the natural, "existing" world may be the
originator of intentions. But if the Husserlian epoche, or the placing aside
of existential meanings and status' of the spatio-temporal world-"Brack
eting"-is effected, what becomes of the ego? For one, the empirical ego,
or worldly I, disappears. I, as the smeller of perfumes, or I, as the watcher
of films, vanish. Only two correlates remain, the intentions of the essence
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(Eidos) of objects. and the pure ego as reference point or origin of these
intentions. In this sense, the pure ego is a phenomenological residuum ofthe
epocM (Hussed: §57, p. 173 and §80, p. 233).
In another vein, my experience at tl, t2, t3, ... , tn must all be my
experiences. These experiences which succeed each other in time must all
refer back to me and to each other as temporally succeeding experiences.
This "stream of experiences" is an unitary totality. The reference point of
this unitary stream of experiences is the pure ego.
But these are not the only functions of the pure ego. In the act of
intention, two factors are differentiated: the hyle and the noetic phase, or
noesis. The hyIe, or material, are the "blank" objects or matter of sensory
experiences. Once intention has pinpointed a certain object or essence, the
hyIe is given "meaning," in the broadest sense ofthe term. Thatis, when one
intends a transcendent object or essence, the hyle which reside in conscious
ness are animated with significance or meaning by the noetic phase. This
noetic phase is the act of bringing or giving hyIe the quality of intentionality
(Hussed: §85, p. 249). The pure ego is that which effects this noetic phase.
IL "glances" toward a "potential field of perception" to individuate objects
or variations of sensory data. In this way, objects are not seen as objects in
themselves-but, in a loose sense, "potter's clay instead of the pot" (Sattre:
trans. intro. p. 20). But this should not be confused with Berkelian idealism.
For in this conception, "the percipi does not contain the esse as a real [or
existential] constituent" (Hussed: §98, p. 287).
Now we sec that the pure ego has a twofold function, that of
providing a reference point to consciousness: "the pure ego as it lives,
wakeful, in the passing thought is the center of reference" (Husselt §84, p.
243); and that ofbcing the origin of consciousness and intentionality, that
of being the true I. Thus Husserl describes the pure ego as a "transcendence
in immanence" (Husser1: §57, p. 173). For the Ego is always present to
consciousness, yet it is not a graspable, or directly intuilable object, in the
way that the empirical is.
Sartre's Critique of the Pure Ego
Sartre wishes to keep phenomenology truly phenomenological. He
feels that if the pure ego is indeed accepted, the study of objects per se will
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no longer be useful. Phenomenology would then be forced to investigate the
constituting function of the pure ego. But let us look into his argument in
greater detail.
For Sartre, consciousness cannot be unified or created by the pure
ego. Consciousness, like the Spinozian substance, may only be differenti
ated and limited by consciousness. The I that exemplifies consciousness as
being mine, is the expression of the unity of consciousness, not the
condition (Sartre: pp. 39-40). Consciousness unifies itself. By referring to
itself or to retentions ofpast consciousnesses, consciousness unifies itself in
time. And in intentions, consciousness is not only of the object, but also of
itself as "pure inwardness." That is, consciousness does not constitu te itself
as a transcendent object; it is aware of itself in a relation of pure intimacy,
so to speak. With this characterization, there is no need of a unifying I.
Consciousness is primordial.
But Sartre does not stop with the view of consciousness in general.
In unreflective or non-reflective consciousness, there is no I hovering
behind the scenes. When one sees a tree or hears music, there is conscious
ness of the tree, or consciousness of the music. These are the necessary
correlates for Sartre, the intending consciousness and the object intended.
So in unreflective consciousness, there is no I (Sartre: p. 47).
But reflective consciousness poses another picture. When one
reflects on a past consciousness, both the past object ofintention and an I,
intending, appear. Yet this is reflection within a reflective memory. When
one reflects, or attempts to place himself or herself in a past consciousness,
that is, within a non-reflective memory, no I appears. For example, I may
reflect on a past experience of listening to Rachmaninov, and intuit the
music, which was the object intended; but I may also intuit myself as
intending or listening to the music. But if I play the cassette of the Piano
Concerto #2 and reflect on a past experience of listening, all that is intuited
is the concerto, there is and was no I.
But if the pure ego were granted, what do we make ofthe reflecting
consciousness of reflective memory? There would be three I's: the I of the
pure ego, the I of the reflecting consciousness, and the I of the reflected
consciousness (Sartte: p. 52), Which would be the correct I, or how would
these I's be consolidated into one complcte, unified 11 For Sartre, this
problcm is insoluble.
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And furthennore, if the pure ego were granted, consciousness
would be weighed down; "[the pure ego] would slide into consciousness like
an opaque blade. The transcendental I is the death ofconsciousness" (Sartre:
p.40). Consciousness would no longer be the absolute, the pure ego would.
Intentionality would then be tainted. Consciousness could no longer be of
an object, but only to itor representative of it. The pure ego would be to the
"concrete and psycho-physical me what a point is to three dimensions: it
would be an infinitely contracted me" (Sartre: p.41).
Sartre concludes his critique with four points: 1) the I is a
transcendent existent, like an object; 2) this I is not intuited in the same
manner as an object, it is, in a sense, almost "inferred-intuited" from
reflecting consciousness; 3) this I only appears on the occasion of the
reflective act; and 4) this I falls like the empirical ego when the phenomeno
logical epoche and reduction are effected (Sartre: pp. 52-53).
Sartre's Theory of the Ego
Sartre's own theory of the ego follows the consequences of his
conclusion above. Consciousness constitutes the ego, and grasps this
creation as if it were in the world-though not like a normal, transcendent
object of the world. In other words, the ego is not in consciousness at all,
it is transcendent, as stated above.
The world provides the ground for the creation and subsistence of
the ego. Objects in the world, when intended by consciousness, are seen as
valuable, hannful, practical, etc. In tum, the self reacts to these constituted
meanings, for they are not in the world, we give the world its meaningful
gloss. The reactions may be of hatred, love, want, desire. etc. But these are
emotive "states:" infinite states of one's being, which cannot be asserted
with certitude. For example, during spontaneous experiences, such as
repugnance, hatred is not causing this feeling of disgust. This spontaneous
experience somehow "emanates" from hatred. And the latter thus appears
through this "emanation" (Sartre: p. 68). But these emotive states, when
totalized, exemplify the ego. Together with actions, the totality of states
refer and constitute the ego. "The ego is to psychical objects [and actions]
what the World is to things" (Sartre: p.75).
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This ego is not an x-pole like an Husserlian noematic nucleus. It is
spontaneously "created" with each state and action that is constituted or
acruated. That is, states do not build the ego, and the ego does not create
states and actions. They come together, cotemporaneously.
In sum, Sanre's theory of the ego follows this strict temporal
outline:
consciousnesses are first [and thus primordial];
through these are constituted states; and then,
through the latter, the ego is constituted (Sartre: p.
81).
Critique of Sartre ' s Theory of the Ego
One problem that occurs with Sartre's conception of the ego is the
unification of consciousness. Each spontaneous consciousness is--with
regard for intentionality-only of the object. How does one consciousness
connect orunify itself with others? Sartre claims that this effected "by a play
of 'transversal' intentionalities which are concrete and real retentions ofpast
consciousnesses" (Sartre: p. 39). Where are these "retentions?" How can
a spontaneous consciousness of an object retain past consciousnesses?
Sartre must then be referring to the memory. So consciousness would not
only be of an object, it would also need to be connected to the memory oflhe
individual. Sartre's solution can only be his assertion that non-reflective
consciousness not only has consciousness of an object. but also non
positional consciousness of itself. But this characterization makes the
intentional aspect of consciousness, a train going toward one place, while
also retaining its origin. Yet for Sartre, there is no origin before conscious
ness. So consciousness is a train travelling toward someplace while also
knowing it is travelling? And again, how does one train connect itself with
the whole line of fellow trains?
In order to preserve the strength of intentionality's claim, con
sciousness must only be totally of its object. Each spontaneous conscious
ness, individually, is only of its particular object.
In another perspective, if Sartre means awareness instead of bare
intentions, it does seem correct to claim that reflective awareness is aware
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ofsornethingwhich is notitself, while also being aware ofitself. This is what
Descartes exhibits by the Cogito, the I think. But Same criticizes this point.
The I ofthe I think is presumptuous. It would be more precise to say, "there
is thinking."
But then what would hold thinking into a conceivable concept?
That is, if the I were not part of the I think, what would be the object ofthe
thinking? It would be caught in a circle within itself; subject would totally
equal object. The thinking-I of the Cogito is the object or intention of the
thought. And this in tenable, for the Cogito ofDescartes is one ofreflection.
We may again approach the problem of consciousness unification.
Would it be more correct to claim that consciousness is ofthe object, yet also
non-positionally of its origin: the ego? This would fall into the same trap
as Sartre. In non-reflective consciousness, it is granted that there is no
awareness of an I. But this does not mean that there is no I. And in fact, in
non-reflective consciousness there is no consciousness of itself either.
WhenSartreclaims, iUs "not 'J have consciousness ofthis chair,' but 'There
is consciousness of this chair'" (Same: p. 53), he is still making the mistake
that he is trying to correct. To claim that "there is consciousness of...." is
just as presumptuous as claiming the I of the consciousness-if Sartre is
correct on that matter. He is .still caught in the web of mistaking renective
consciousness for non-reflective consciousness. Sartre would instead have
to claim, "Chair," That is all. When I see the page of my book in non
reflective consciousness, it is just"page" or"word." Thus, no consciousness
appears in the non-reflective consciousness. And ifone argues further, there
is no consciousness at all?
If we take Sartre's claim that the I only appears on the reflective
level and not on the unreflective level of consciousness, we see that this
assertion is only a cognitive distinction. Somehow, in non-reflective
consciousness, the I just doesn't appear to our awareness. At the non
reflective level, it does seem that, whatever we in fact are, we arc wholly part
ofthe world. We "lose ourselves" in and to the world; but only cognitively.
not literally, And if we assume that there is consciousness of something at
the non-reflective level, what stops us from asserting an I?
This I is the only possible entity that could unify many multifarious
consciousnesses. For these spontaneities need a reference point, an anchor.
Objects provide an anchor of some sort, but only as destinations.

THE PURE EGO

51

Now, on another note, does the I actually weigh down conscious
ness? In a sense, yes. Foritdoes provide an anchor or reference origin. But
ifthere is no I, spontaneous consciousness would be chaotic spurts into the
world that cling onto objects like mosquitoes onto skin.
And to the question of three I's, these may only be different
expressions of the true I. The I of reflected, past consciousness is an
abstraction or past I. For one, it defInitely is not me. It is only a me, a
correlate of my past consciousness. And here, we may see the I as it was,
or more precisely, what we think it was. I have no contact with this past I,
it is just a picture of myself, a portrait. The I which is reflecting on a past
consciousness is the true I. The I which reflects on myself now, is also the
true I. Hence, the third I, the I of the transcendental ego, is not needed here,
it is identical to the I of reflecting consciousness.
Here I am not claiming to define or describe the I in all of its facets.
This I is in one sense, a felt I, the I of introspection, and in another
perspective, an irreducible element. On this second perspective ofthe Ego,
I agree with Husserl, though not without reservation, when he claims
the experiencing Ego is still nothing that might be
taken for itself and made into an object of inquiry
on its own account. Apart from its "ways of being
related" or "ways of behaving," it is completely
empty of essential components. it has not content
that could be unravelled, it is in and for itself
indescribable: pure Ego and nothing further
(Husserl: §80, p. 233).
The lucidity of consciousness and intentionality may still be upheld
ifthe pure ego, or at least some sort of transcendental I, is asserted. In fact,
lucidity only makes sense when it is referred to the I. In contradistinction,
Sartre would claim that lucidity is referred only to consciousness.
In this way, Sartre tries to make two l's. The unity of consciousness
is an I, and the transcendent ego is another. We as humans become unified
streams of experiences supporting a created object, which is a false image
of ourselves. And these unifIed streams of consciousnesses cannot be an 1.
And I must be some sort of true unity. Spontaneous consciousnesses are just
that: spontaneities, what would Sartre unify them into? A huge totalized
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consciousness? In Sartre' s theory my experiences wouldn't be mine, in fact,
I wouldn't exist, there would just be experiences.
Sartre has repudiated the pure ego so he may assert the freedom of
the individual. But the pure ego does not in any way hamper freedom. On
the contrary, freedom presupposes it. For what is free? The self as subject
is free to choose, not consciousness.
And this relation, of selfto consciousness, is then Sartre' s problem,
or our problem in interpreting Sartre. Henri Ey has summed up this problem
in ConsciousnesS. Either Sartre equates the self to consciousness (which he
seems to do within Transcendence of the Ego), or he divides the self from
consciousness so radically, that an insoluble fissure is created (Ey: p. 204).
Ey describes consciousness and the self as cotemporaneous and comple
mentary. the self becomes transcendent and somewhat transcendental
precisely through its becoming. Without going into the details of Ey's
argument, we may just see that the self, while alive, is a becoming with a
reference point. And this reference point, or pure ego, is not a mass that
encumbers our actions, our thoughts, or our freedom. Consciousness is a
state-not Sartrean-or sign of the seirs life and ability for Erlebnisse
(experiences). It is the media through and in which conscious life takes
place. It provides the middle ground between transcendent objects and our
selves. And through our interactions and our Erlebnisse, consciousness and
its correlates, memory and a self-view of the self, become. This preserves
the dictum of freedom, "existence precedes essence." First We exist, as
selves, with particular reference points, then we make ourselves. There is
no "essence" to the pure ego, it does not define what we are, or more
precisely, what we will be. It is an Archimedean point on which we will
build. And how do we build onto this point? Via our abilities for Erlebnisse,
via our consciousness.
But, alas, this is only an abstract and theoretical outline. The
problem is to clearly and adequately describe the self's, the ego's, relation
to consciousness.
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